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… then the explanations of totalitarian terror in terms of functional requisites of totalitarianism as a system or a general ideological fanaticism in the ruling elite would appear to have been basically erroneous – a conclusion which derives further strength from the fact that the ruling elite in post-Stalin Russia remains committed to the Communist ideology. (ibid.: 571)
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In the sociological and ideological analyses of totalitarianism qua novel contemporary phenomenon (Hannah Arendt, Talmon, C. J. Friedrich, Brzezinski) a dialectical moment may be discerned in the evolution of terminology. If the concept of totality is not merely quantitative but instead consists of a specific intensity of organised power, then it is not the state, but strictly a party that constitutes the subject and protagonist of totalitarianism. In these circumstances, part of the erstwhile totality confronts the latter as a new totality and demotes the state to a mere quantitative totality. Accordingly, the historical dialectic brings about a negation of the erstwhile totality by a part thereof, whereas the latter asserts its status as something more than the pre-existing totality. In this sense, there are no totalitarian states, only totalitarian parties. (*) (Schmitt 1973: 366f)
The foreign policy of the bourgeois world is in truth always only focused on borders, whereas the National Socialist movement, in contrast, will pursue a policy focused on space … The National Socialist movement … knows no Germanization … but only the expansion of our own people … The national conception will not be determined by previous patriotic notions of state, but rather by ethnic and racial conceptions. The German borders of 1914 … represented something just as unfinished as peoples’ borders always are. The division of territory on the earth is always the momentary result of a struggle and an evolution that is in no way finished, but that naturally continues to progress. (Hitler in Bartov 2004: 4)
maintained that moralαρετη is invariably found as.
Although early efforts focused on symbolic manipulation and linguistic representation, most now use the notion of parallel distributed processing for the construction of a quasi-neural network that recognize and associate patterns.
The is the principal subject of .
Hopes (or fears) of the success of this discipline often give rise to philosophical questions about whether purely physical systems can adequately support,, and.
In , an argument form is any one of of.
by Scientific American (Time-Warner, 2002);Craig DeLancey, (Oxford, 2002);Renée Elio, (Oxford, 2002);Sam Williams, (Random House, 2002);Craig DeLancey, (Oxford, 2002);Daniel C.
Recommended Reading:Plato, , tr.
It is sometimes suggested, therefore, that existentialism just is thisbygone cultural movement rather than an identifiable philosophicalposition; or, alternatively, that the term should be restricted toSartre's philosophy alone. But while a philosophical definition ofexistentialism may not entirely ignore the cultural fate of the term,and while Sartre's thought must loom large in any account ofexistentialism, the concept does pick out a distinctive cluster ofphilosophical problems and helpfully identifies a relatively distinctcurrent of twentieth- and now twenty-first-century philosophicalinquiry, one that has had significant impact on fields such astheology (through Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, andothers) and psychology (from Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss to OttoRank, R. D. Laing, and Viktor Frankl). What makes this current ofinquiry distinct is not its concern with “existence” ingeneral, but rather its claim that thinking about humanexistence requires new categories not found in the conceptualrepertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can beunderstood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor assubjects interacting with a world of objects.
Grube (Hackett, 1992);Nickolas Pappas, (Routledge, 2003);Also see .
On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is notenough to know all the truths that natural science—including thescience of psychology—could tell us. The dualist who holds thathuman beings are composed of independentsubstances—“mind” and “body”—is nobetter off in this regard than is the physicalist, who holds thathuman existence can be adequately explained in terms of thefundamental physical constituents of the universe. Existentialism doesnot deny the validity of the basic categories of physics, biology,psychology, and the other sciences (categories such as matter,causality, force, function, organism, development, motivation, and soon). It claims only that human beings cannot be fully understood interms of them. Nor can such an understanding be gained bysupplementing our scientific picture with a moralone. Categories of moral theory such as intention, blame,responsibility, character, duty, virtue, and the like docapture important aspects of the human condition, but neither moralthinking (governed by the norms of the good and the right) norscientific thinking (governed by the norm of truth)suffices.